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Abstract
General equilibrium analysis shows that regulation based on caps on working hours per ves-
sel affect the entry/exit margin (more low productivity vessels stay in the fishery), wages (a
less productive fleet implies lower equilibrium wages) and aggregate employment allocated to
the sector. Although the total number of vessels increases, total employment in the fishery
is reduced and the aggregate rents generated in the fishery are lower. Moreover, regula-
tory policies based on input controls also affect capital dynamics across the stock recovery
phases. In comparison with a fishery regulated via efficient instruments, we find that those
dynamics are characterized by fewer exits of vessels. Finally, using data from the West-
ern Mediterranean Sea, we show that the use of input controls gives rise to a Spanish fleet
around 14 percent larger than the one that would result from a non-distortionary instrument.
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1 Introduction
Fisheries in the Mediterranean Sea have traditionally been managed via input measures1,
specifically caps on working hours per vessel (see, for instance, Maynou et al. (2006), and
Cardinale and Scarcella (2017)). Seminal papers such as Squires (1987) and Kompas et al.
(2004), among others, show that policies based on input controls induce fishers to replace reg-
ulated inputs by unregulated inputs, generating economic inefficiencies that reduce vessels’
productivity.
In this paper we extend the analysis of the impact of input controls to a dynamic general
equilibrium framework. In particular, we focus on the effect of input controls on individual
firms’ decisions. We assume that individual decisions are taken based on rational expecta-
tions. This enables us to relate fleet dynamics to the policy instruments used to manage the
fishery.
As is done in Da-Rocha et al. (2017b), we consider that the abilities of individual firms
follow a stochastic process and that there is a fixed operating cost that firms must incur
if they want to remain in the fishery. We use a general equilibrium framework to compute
how input controls affect endogenous prices, labour supply and the number, productivity
and composition of the fleet.
The general equilibrium analysis presented here provides new insights not offered by a partial
equilibrium analysis. When the impact of a given policy is analyzed in a general equilibrium
setting, the aggregate effect is the result of several effects that are assessed separately in
partial equilibrium models. Therefore, the final result may be different from the one predicted
by a partial equilibrium analysis. Some of the main insights regarding these differences are
explained below.
1In a few cases, e. g. bluefin tuna and swordfish, output measures are used (see, for instance,
the summary of the rules used in the Mediterranean Sea in the website of the European Union
https://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/mediterranean/rules en).
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A cap on working hours per vessel generates static input misallocation across heterogeneous
vessels that reduces productivity. A constraint on the hours worked per vessel leads more
productive firms to produce less than they would optimally produce. In consequence, those
firms are not producing at the optimal scale level and their production costs are not mini-
mized, leading to an inefficient allocation. Catches per unit of effort (CPUE) are lower than
optimal. Therefore, to produce the same aggregate yield, more vessels are needed under input
controls than under a non-distortionary price-based instrument. This static misallocation
is also analyzed in Johnson and Libecap (1982), where two fishers facing different marginal
costs but symmetrically sharing a globally efficient quota, do not maximize aggregate profits.
In addition to these partial equilibrium insights, general equilibrium analysis also means
that the number of fishermen does not remain constant when quotas are not distributed
efficiently. In fact, policies also affect the composition of the fleet. Input controls reduce
individual profits and also the continuation value of remaining active in the fishery. This
reduction in individual profits, affects all the firms in the distribution via prices (and not
only those on which the input constraint is binding), affects exit decisions and determines
the productivity distribution of the fleet in equilibrium. Input controls mean that more
low-productivity vessels stay in the fishery, causing dynamic input misallocation.
A less productive fleet means lower equilibrium wages. Lower wages reduce the attractiveness
of working in the fishery. In contrast with what would happen in a partial equilibrium
setting, total employment in the fishery is reduced. Therefore, despite the increase in the
number of vessels in the fishery, the cap on working hours per vessel does not increase total
employment in the fishery (as the total number of working hours is reduced at the fishery
level). All these factors mean that, despite the fact that the cap on working hours per vessel
induces substitution of labor by capital, the aggregate rents generated in the fishery are
lower. The fishery is thus less wealthy.
Regulatory policies based on input controls also have effects on capital dynamics across the
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stock recovery phases. In comparison with a fishery regulated with efficient instruments, we
find that those dynamics are characterized by fewer exits of vessels from the fishery at the
initial stages, as the fleet tends to stay in during the initial stages of a fishery rationalization
policy (in which present catches are reduced in order to increase the stock of fish with a
view to increasing captures in the future). Given that input controls are associated with
larger fleets which are less productive, although the average reduction in catches is the same
regardless the regulatory instrument used, that reduction represents a lower proportion of
the fixed costs and thus induces fewer exits when input controls are used.
Finally, when input controls are used, vessels enter at earlier stages and the fleet is replenished
with less efficient vessels than when efficient regulatory instruments are used. Entry occurs
earlier because, the low productivity of the entrants means that entry increases capacity
more slowly than when an efficient regulatory instrument is used.
The work presented here is related to three strands of literature: the literature assessing
the impact of removing constraints, the literature analyzing malleability of capital, and the
literature on rational expectations and excess capacity.
In relation to the literature assessing the impact of removing constraints, there are examples
of how policies affect the composition of the productivity of a fleet. For instance, Lian et al.
(2009) measure the extent of harvesting inefficiency in the Pacific Coast groundfish fishery
under the controlled access management program and predict the equilibrium fleet structure,
harvesting costs, and fishery rents that are expected to emerge under an individual fishing
quota management program (without and with restrictions in transferability). They esti-
mate the savings in cost associated with policies inducing the use of the most efficient cost
structure. By explicitly considering an endogenous distribution of firms, our general equilib-
rium setting enables us to compute the endogenous change in the distribution of productivity
due to the use of input controls and compare the results with any other regulatory policy.
This is more general than computing the impact of removing distortions by comparing two
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cost structures. We use calibrated costs to predict the number and type (length class) of
vessels.
We explicitly consider individual firms’ entry and exit decisions, so our work is closely related
to the literature analyzing malleability of capital. In our paper the degree of malleability
of capital is endogenous to regulatory policies. Analysis of the dynamics of firms based on
individual stay/exit decisions has received much less attention in the economic literature
than the analysis of optimal capacity investment paths under the assumption of a sole fleet
owner.2
Capital at fishery level is closely related to the entry and exit decisions taken by firms, which
are based on their expectations as regards current and futures policies. This is especially
relevant when changes in fishery management policies are assessed, especially on those which
seek higher stock levels. In our model, individual rational decisions are based on the whole
transitional dynamic (induced by the instrument used to achieve the stock rehabilitation
objective). Individual firms assess the expected value of staying in the industry at each
moment and compare it to the present discounted value of profits associated with exiting
the industry. Based on this comparison, individual firms decide to stay in or exit the industry.
The aggregate behavior of individual firms, and not the decision of a monopolistic fleet owner,
determines the dynamic of capital in the industry.
In relation to the literature relating expectations and excess capacity, we highlight the link
between rational (forward-looking) expectations and the resultant level of excess capacity.
Our results show that, in contrast with modeling frameworks based on myopic expectations
such as Rust et al. (2016), vessels will enter the fishery even when the fish stock is lower than
2Indeed, in the spirit of Smith (1968, 1969) the literature has mostly focused on models in which capital
is assumed to be equal to the number of vessels in fleets composed by homogeneous vessels. Stay/exit
decisions have been modeled as investment/disinvestment decisions, and (usually) a sole fleet owner chooses
the optimal fleet size, or the capacity utilization under different assumptions on investment cost (Boyce, 1995;
Nøstbakken, 2008; Sandal et al., 2007), stock dynamics (Botsford and Wainwright, 1985), stock uncertainty
(Hannesson, 1987; Singh et al., 2006; Da-Rocha et al., 2014a) and the strategic effect of irreversible investment
decisions in a strategic environment (Sumaila, 1995). For a summary of the literature see Nøstbakken et al.
(2011).
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its steady state stock level. Therefore, rational expectations on the transitional path have
empirically testable implications. If we assume that vessels enter the fishery only when the
fish stock is greater than its steady state stock, entry will ever be observed in the course of
the fishery recovery process. Moreover, the model predicts that exits will be more numerous
and faster when the fishery recovery policy is based on a non-distortionary instrument.
This finding is consistent with the fleet decrease observed in the Northeast Multispecies
(Groundfish) U.S. fishery after the introduction of the New Management Plan in 2010 which
reinforced the use of market instruments.3
Finally, in our model malleability is generated by the optimal individual decisions of entering,
exiting and staying. These decisions are endogenous to the policy instrument used for the
stock recovery and therefore, cannot be predicted by a regression model (e.g. probit or logit
models). If the probabilities of entering, exiting and staying are estimated using historical
data, as for example in Tidd et al. (2011), exit may be underestimated if there is a structural
change in the regulatory regime of the fishery.
2 The Model
As occurs in Terrebonne (1995) and Heaps (2003), we consider a natural resource industry
with heterogeneous firms. This industry is output-constrained by a regulatory agency in
order to rehabilitate a given stock. Moreover, we assume that entry is allowed only when
quota, Q, exceeds capacity.
There are two markets in the economy: The final goods and labor (which is used to produce
the final good) markets. Taking output price as the numeraire, we denote wages by w(t).
We assume that a continuum of identical households, which own the firms, consume the final
3 Da-Rocha et al. (2017b) report that after remaining stable from 2007 to 2009, the number of active
vessels decreased by 32% in the Northeast Multispecies (Groundfish) U.S. fishery in 2010.
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good and supply labor by solving a consumption-leisure maximization problem.
We assume that firms have a finite lifespan and are heterogeneous. Let g(z, t) be the measure
of firms over time (i.e. the number of firms with productivity z at time t). The decision
rules of incumbent firms at time t depend on z. We denote the optimal choices of output
and labor by y(z, t) and l(z, t).
As occurs in Da-Rocha et al. (2017b) , we assume that the abilities of individual firms
follow a stochastic process and that there is a fixed operating cost of cf that must be paid
by individual firms that remain active in the industry. These two assumptions mean that
individual firms change over time. At each particular moment in time some of them expand
production, hiring staff, while others contract production, firing staff, and others exit the
industry altogether.
The decision problem of incumbent firms produces two types of decision rules. There are
continuous decision rules for the optimal choice of output y(z, t) and labor l(z, t), and there
is a discrete decision rule for the optimal stay/exit decision. This implies, on the one hand,
that there is endogenous exiting. This decision depends on employment l(z, t) and output
y(z, t) in each period. Conditional on the choices in each period, l(z, t) and y(z, t), each firm
must assess the expected value of staying in the industry and must compare it to the present
discounted value of profits associated with exiting the industry S(t) -a scrap value-. On the
other hand, a finite vessel lifespan implies depreciation.
Finally, when managers of fisheries allow entry, we assume as does Luttmer (2007) that
potential entrants copy incumbents. Overall, this means that the distribution of the pro-
ductivity of firms, g(z, t), changes over time and is endogenously determined by exiting
decisions.
The model is analyzed in three steps. First we solve the individual problems of firms and
households. This establishes the relationship between input controls and exit decisions. Then
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we specify the dynamics of the distribution of firms and the feasibility conditions. Finally
we define the equilibrium.
The problem of incumbent firms is as follows. Let τl(t) be a constraint on effort (in particular,
τl(t) is the maximum number of working hours per vessel in period t). Conditional on this
constraint, firms maximize profits subject to the technology available to them, y(z, t) =√
z l(z, t).4 Thus, at time t the intra-temporal profit maximization problem is
max
l(z,t),y(z,t)
y(z, t)− w(t)l(z, t)− cf ,
s.t. y(z, t) =
√
z l(z, t),
l(z, t) ≤ τl(t),
where profits are defined as revenues y(z, t), less labor costs w(t)l(z, t), less fixed operation
costs cf . Note that we assume that fishermen’s behavior is not affected by stock variability
(so we are not including the stock of fish explicitly in the maximization problem) and that
physical capital at vessel level is non-malleable (which means that we can normalize capital
per vessel to one).5 Solving for the first order conditions of this problem, we find that labor
demand, given by
l(z, t) =

z
4w(t)2
if z ≤ zc(t),
τl(t) if z > z
c(t),
and profits, given by
pi(z, t) =

z
4w(t)
− cf if z ≤ zc(t),
√
zτl(t)− w(t)τl(t)− cf if z > zc(t).
4Our technology complies with the fifty-fifty rule, i.e. 50% of net revenues are accounted for by payments
to crew members.
5In Da-Rocha et al. (2017a) capital is allowed to be an endogenous variable.
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both depend on the input constraint.
We assume that the productivity shock z follows a stochastic process with a negative expected
growth rate, µ, i.e. dz = −µdt + σzdW, where σz is the per-unit time volatility, and dW is
the random increment to a Weiner process. The dynamic incumbents’ problem is a stopping
time problem defined by
v(z, t) = max
τ
E0
∫ τ
0
pi(z, t)e(ρ+λ)tdt+ S(t)eρt,
s.t. dz = −µzdt+ σzdwz.
where λ is the exogenous death rate of firms6, τ is the time required by a firm to take a
given action and ρ is the discount rate. Let z be such that the firm does not exit. Then the
following Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman (HJB) equation holds:
(ρ+ λ)v(z, t) = pi(z, t)− cf + µz∂zv(z, t) + σ
2
z
2
∂zzv(z, t) + ∂tv(z, t).
The value matching and smooth pasting conditions at the switching point z are v(z, t) =
S(t) and v′(z, t) = 0, respectively. For z lower than the exit threshold, z ≤ z, we have
v(z, t) = S(t). The incumbent’s problem can also be written as an Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman
(HJB) variational inequality, i.e.
min
Iexit(z,t)
{
(ρ+ λ)v(z, t)− pi(z, t) + cf − µz∂zv(z, t)− σ
2
z
2
∂zzv(z, t)− ∂tv(z, t), v(z, t)− S(t)
}
(1)
where Iexit(z, t) is an indicator function that summarizes the endogenous decision to exit.
Firms operate capital (the vessel) and stay active if they find it optimal to pay the idling cost,
cf . Note that the marginal firm (the least efficient active vessel) is indifferent between paying
the idling cost and exiting the market. This marginal firm makes negative instantaneous
6The death rate of firms is equal to the inverse of the vessel lifetime.
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profits, i.e. pi(z, t) − cf = −σ22 ∂zzv(z, t) < 0, and the total expected value of operating the
vessel is zero.7
Each representative household solves a static consumption-leisure maximization problem:
max
C(t),L(t)
logC(t)− eL(t),
subject to the budget constraint C(t) = w(t)L(t) + Π(t), where the right-hand side of the
budget constraint is given by the wage income w(t)L(t) and the total profits of operating
firms, Π(t).8 Wages are determined by
w(t) = e[w(t)L(t) + Π(t)].
For prices to be calculated, the dynamics of firms must be computed. In our economy, the
change over time in the distribution of firms is determined endogenously by entry/exit deci-
sions made by the firms themselves. As stated previously, entry occurs when the incumbents
are not producing the total quota allowed (i.e. when the quota allowed exceeds the capac-
ity of the fleet). We assume that entrants imitate incumbents in the sense that they are
drawn from the incumbents’ stationary distribution of productivity. This would close the
model because the distribution of the entrants is endogenously generated by the policy in
7If the marginal active firm decides to leave the market, it obtains the value v(z) = S = 0. From the
smooth pasting condition and stationarity, (∂zv(z, t) = ∂tv(z, t) = 0) we have equation (1) −pi(z, t) + cf +
σ2
2 ∂zzv(z, t) = 0.
8Controls on inputs/outputs per vessel generate unemployment and (potentially) introduce heterogeneity
in households. We apply a convenient technical device developed by Hansen (1985) and Rogerson (1988)
to simplify the problem and use a representative household framework to solve it. That is, we assume that
there is a lottery such that each household has an equal probability pn of being selected to work. Therefore,
in expected terms, each household will work pnL hours. Note that the rules of this lottery mean that there
is perfect insurance in the sense that every household gets paid whether it works or not. Hence, they will
have identical consumption, i.e. C = wL + Π. Under these conditions, the utility function associated with
the lottery is quasilinear in labor.
10
equilibrium. Formally, g(z, t) follows a Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck (KFP) equation
∂tg(z, t) = −∂z[µzg(z, t)] + σ
2
z
2
∂zzg(z, t)− (Iexit(z, t) + λ)g(z, t) + ge(z, t). (2)
where entry, when allowed, is given by the distribution ge(z, t) where
ge(z, t) =

(t)gss(z) if
∫
y(z, t)(1− Iexit(z, t)− λ)g(z, t) < Q(t),
0 in other case
where the entry rate, (t) verifies
∫
y(z, t) [(1− Iexit(z, t)− λ)g(z, t) + (t)gss(z)] dz = Q(t).
After entry is calculated, we use the distribution to compute the number of firms, i.e. N(t) =∫ ∞
z(t)
g(z)dz.
Notice that, in a fishery without ITQs the fact that managers of the fishery allow entry only
when quota exceeds capacity means that entry is not regulated by a zero profit condition as
in other papers9.
To close the model we need to define feasibility conditions. The household budget constraint
means that the final output market is in equilibrium. That is,
C(t) = w(t)L(t) + Π(t)⇒ C(t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
y(z, t)g(z, t)dz − cfN(t),
where cfN(t) is the value of output allocated to produce the fixed operating cost.
10 The
9For instance Da-Rocha et al. (2017b) assume a zero profit condition for entrants.
10Note that C(t) is equal to
w(t)L(t) + Π(t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
w(t)l(t)g(z, t)dz +
∫ ∞
z(t)
(y(t)− w(t)l(t)− cf ) g(z, t)dz =
∫ ∞
z(t)
y(z, t)g(z, t)dz − cfN(t).
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manager of the fishery sets the input control such that the individual decisions given by
y(z, t) =

y(z, t)∗ =
z
2w(t)
if z ≤ zc(t)
y(z, t)c =
√
zτl(t) if z > z
c(t)
satisfy the quota path, Q(t). Therefore, feasibility conditions in the labor and output markets
are given by
∫ ∞
z(t)
l(z, t)g(z, t)dz = L(t), (3)∫ zc(t)
z(t)
y∗(z, t)g(z, t)dz +
∫ ∞
zc(t)
y(z, t)cg(z, t)dz = Q(t). (4)
Note that, given Q(t), equations (3-4) jointly determine w(t) and zc(t). Moreover, after some
manipulation we can write the wage as a function of e, Q(t) and the mass of firms, N(t), i.e
w(t) = e [Q(t)− cfN(t)] ,
which shows that wages will be lower when N(t) is larger.
Given expectations about prices, in this economy firms solve their individual problems (equa-
tion (1)), and decide whether or not to stay in the fishery. Given this decision (summarized
by Iexit(z, t)), equation (2) enables us to compute the equilibrium distribution of firms and
check, using feasibility conditions (3 -4), whether the expectations are “rational”. Appendix
A.1 provides a formal definition of the steady state and how to compute it.
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3 Case study
We apply the model to assess the impact of input controls on the Spanish demersal fleet
in the Mediterranean Sea. The data used comes from the Expert Working Group of the
Multiannual Plan for demersal fisheries in the Western Mediterranean drawn up by the
Scientific, Technical and Economic Committee for Fisheries (STECF, 2016b).
According to STECF (2016a), in 2014, the fleet potentially targeting demersal fisheries
covered by the Multiannual Plan numbered around 9,000 vessels with a combined gross
tonnage of 56,331 GT and engine power of 473,615 kW. They accounted for 932,798 days
at sea, and the estimated employment in these fisheries was 14,119 jobs, corresponding to
10,717 full time equivalent jobs.
The main species caught in the demersal fishery in the Western Mediterranean Sea are hake,
red mullet, blue whiting, monkfish, deep-water rose shrimp, giant red shrimp, blue and red
shrimp and Norway lobster. In 2014 landings of hake, red mullet, and deep water rose
shrimp totaled 10,000 metric tones, accounting for about e69 million (around 25% of the
overall demersal output). The leading species in both volume and value was hake, followed
by red mullet and deep water rose shrimp. In Geographical Sub Areas (GSA) 1-7, hake is
principally targeted by Spanish vessels (which land 58% of the total). The average price of
the red mullet, deep water rose shrimp, and hake landed by Spanish vessels are e5.92/kg,
e16.15/kg, and e6.68/kg, respectively.
We consider a stock rehabilitation policy associated with a reduction in the fishing mortality
level from the status quo to the maximum sustainable yield (MSY) fishing mortality level.
Table 1 provides the details of the reduction in fishing mortality for each of the 14 different
stocks considered by (STECF, 2016b).
To compute the output constraints faced by the Spanish fleet associated with the stock
rehabilitation policy, we use the value added path generated by the age-structured models
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Table 1: Species caught by Spanish demersal fishing vessels in the Mediterranean
Sea and reference points
GSA 3A code Scientific name Ref year FMSY Fcurr/FMSY
1 7 HKE Merluccius merluccius 2014 0.39 3.59
1 ARA Aristeus antennatus 2014 0.41 3.41
1 ANK Lophius budegassa 2013 0.16 1.56
1 MUT Mullus barbatus 2013 0.27 4.85
1 DPS Parapenaeus longirostris 2012 0.26 1.65
5 ARA Aristeus antennatus 2013 0.24 1.75
5 ANK Lophius budegassa 2013 0.08 10.50
5 MUT Mullus barbatus 2012 0.14 6.64
5 DPS Parapenaeus longirostris 2012 0.62 1.24
6 ANK Lophius budegassa 2013 0.14 6.50
6 MUT Mullus barbatus 2013 0.45 3.27
6 DPS Parapenaeus longirostris 2012 0.27 5.19
7 ANK Lophius budegassa 2011 0.29 3.34
7 MUT Mullus barbatus 2013 0.14 3.21
Source: STECF (2016b)
Table 2: Species and Prices of Spanish demersal fisheries in the Mediterranean
Sea
Species
DW Red blue and red
hake red mullet Shrimp Monk fish shrimp
country GSA HKE MUT DPS ANK ARA
Spain 1 x x x x
Spain 5 x x x x
Spain 6 x x x x
France /Spain 7 x x
HKE MUT DPS ANK ARA
Share of each Species 1-7 0.58 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
HKE MUT DPS ANK ARA
Prices of each Species 1-7 6.68 5.93 16.15 =HKE =DPS
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for each species (see Appendix A.2). Table 2 also provides the ex-vessel prices used.
3.1 Calibration
Table 3: Calibration
Parameter Value Statistic
Q 1 TAC Normalization
e 1.5339 utility parameter L=1/3
ρ 0.04 discount rate Da-Rocha et al. (2014b)
λ 0.04 vessel lifespan 25 years
µ -0.04 Productivity Drift Da-Rocha et al. (2014b)
σ2 0.01 Productivity Drift Da-Rocha and Sempere (2016)
S 0 Scrap value No decommissioning scheme
cf 0.2403 fixed cost STECF (2016b)
We select the values of µ and σ2 from Da-Rocha et al. (2014b). Given this stochastic process,
it is necessary to calibrate six parameters Q, λ, S, cf , e and ρ. We start by selecting a value
for the annual interest rate of ρ = 0.04 which is standard in macroeconomic literature.11 We
set Q = 1. We consider a vessel life span of 25 years (λ = 0.04). We assume that there are
no decommissioning schemes, S = 0. We use data from structure and economic performance
estimates by fleets from EU Member States operating in the Mediterranean & Black Sea
regions in 2014 to compute the fixed cost.12 Finally, we calibrate the utility parameter e by
solving the model when the economy is non-distorted in order to match a labor supply of
1/3. This is a standard normalization in macroeconomic literature.
11See, for instance Restuccia and Rogerson (2008).
12See Table 4.3 of the STECF (2016b).
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4 Results
This section is divided into two parts. Part 1 presents the main results regarding the steady
state solution of the model. Part 2 presents the results of the analysis of the transitional
dynamics implied by stock rehabilitation policies leading to a situation in which all stocks
are at their MSY fishing mortality level.
4.1 Steady state solution
Table 4 shows the steady state associated with different levels of effort control τl (measured
as the % of z constrained). This table illustrates input misallocation across heterogeneous
vessels which reduces productivity (CPUE), generates lower equilibrium wages (w), and
reduces employment levels (L) in the fishery.
In this economy the total output is given. Therefore, to measure the distortion produced
by the use of input controls we use the difference in consumption generated from the same
output level under different regulatory policies. From the feasibility conditions, it is possible
to write consumption as the difference between output and the resources used to produce
the operating costs , i.e. Q − cfN . Our results mean that an economy without distortions
allocates 3.2 % of its total resources to operating cost, cfN , while in the most distorted
economy considered operating costs are 4.2 %. Therefore, total output is reduced by 1%.
To evaluate the macroeconomic and welfare implications of effort controls (changes in τl), the
model generates the optimal response in three (management) variables: (1) average catch
per unit effort CPUE = E[y(z, t)/l(z, t)]; (2) average days at sea per vessel, E[l(z, t)]; and
(3) the number of vessels, N(t).13
13Given that
Y (t) = N(t)
∫ ∞
z(t)
(
y(z, t)
l(z, t)
)
l(z, t)g(z, t)dz.
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Table 4: Effects of different levels of control on days
Q =1
Control on Inputs % of z constrained 0.000 0.187 0.375 0.562 0.750
Fleet Size N 0.132 0.133 0.138 0.149 0.175
wage w 1.485 1.485 1.483 1.479 1.469
data per vessel
CPUE E[y(z)/l(z)] 2.971 2.970 2.966 2.958 2.939
Employment per vessel E[l(z)] 2.553 2.505 2.348 2.047 1.536
Yield per vessel E[y(z)] 7.583 7.509 7.254 6.724 5.710
Profits per vessel E[pi(z)] 3.551 3.550 3.532 3.456 3.213
Wealth per vessel E[v(z)] 28.778 28.785 28.764 28.502 27.202
Inequality: Gini Coeff.
Revenues E[y(z)] 0.573 0.573 0.573 0.573 0.573
Wealth E[v(z)] 0.624 0.624 0.623 0.620 0.606
Aggregate Accounts
Operating Cost cfN 0.032 0.032 0.033 0.036 0.042
Consumption Q− cfN 0.968 0.968 0.967 0.964 0.958
Remuneration of employees wL 0.500 0.495 0.480 0.450 0.395
Gross operating surplus Π 0.468 0.473 0.487 0.514 0.563
Days at the see
Total days at sea L 0.337 0.334 0.324 0.304 0.269
Impact of effort control L/L∗ 1.000 0.991 0.961 0.904 0.799
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Figure 1: General Equilibrium effects of different levels of control on days in the Steady
State
Effort controls –i.e. caps on working hours per vessel– change all three management variables
at the same time. First notice that effort controls create lower wages. The intuition of this
result is as follows: The constraint on working hours per vessel leads more productive firms
to produce less than they would optimally produce, which leads to an inefficient allocation.
Therefore catches per unit of effort (CPUE) are lower than optimal so, to produce the
same aggregate output, more vessels are needed under input controls than under a non-
distortionary price-based instrument. Thus, if there are effort controls in place, more vessels
are active for the same quota than if there are not. Notice too that having more vessels
means higher operating costs, cfN , and remember from the household problem in Section
2 that higher operating costs mean a lower consumption level C = [Q − cfM ]. This lower
consumption level increases the marginal utility of labor. Therefore, in equilibrium wages
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have to decrease so the following equation holds:
∂CU(C)w(t) = −∂LU(L)⇒ w(t)
C(t)
= e(t).
Note that for the new wage rate (induced by the effort control) the labor supply is lower (the
graph at the top left in Figure 1 illustrates this). Lower wages result in changes in nominal
effort composition. On the one hand, the demand for labor on each vessel is reduced, i.e.
effort control is active and E[l(z)] is lower for each vessel -each vessel spends fewer days
at sea- (the graph at the top right in Figure 1 illustrates this). On the other hand, lower
wages induce some vessels that would otherwise exit to stay, as z decreases and the average
productivity of the fleet, E[z] decreases. Therefore an increment in fleet size is compatible
with fewer days at sea in total L(t) = N(t)E[l(z)] and lower effort per vessel E[l(z)] generated
by effort controls. The graph at the top right in Figure 1 illustrates this last effect.
Summarizing, effort controls give rise to fleets with more vessels. Productivity of vessels
(TFP= E[y(z)/l(z)]) is reduced, vessels stay at sea for fewer days (lower E[l(z)]), and total
catches per vessel, E[y(z)], are lower. As a result, both profits per vessel and the value of
each vessel (E[pi(z)] and E[v(z)], respectively) are lower.
4.2 Entry / Exit behavior in a stock rebuilding process
In our model N(t) is equivalent to aggregate capital in period t. Therefore investment in
capital, satisfies N(t+ dt) = N(t) + I(t), where,
I(t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
[ge(z, t)− (Iexit(z, t) + λ)g(z, t)] dz.
To assess the impact of input controls (a cap on working hours per vessel) on entry and exit,
we need to compute a transition (as in the steady state I(t) =
∫
λg(t, z)dz).
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As occurs in Clark et al. (1979) and in Clark et al. (2017), we choose a stock rebuilding
process to study the impact of the policy. We compute transitions in fisheries with and
without input controls. To minimize the misallocation impact of the cap when total catches
must be reduced (i.e. when the instaled capacity is greater than the catches allowed), we
use sequences of taxes –a non-distortionary instrument– to induce vessels to harvest less.
14 In our model there is not free entry. However, the existence of depreciation, λ, implies
that there is entry to replace capital. Moreover, entry is allowed when total captures must
be increased. In both cases, we assume that potential entrants copy incumbents and select
a vessel -draw a z- from the stationary distribution (which is an endogenous equilibrium
object). See Appendix A.3 for a formal description of the transition.
The main findings of the analysis of the transitional dynamics can be summarized as follows:
1. With input controls the adjustment is less drastic and is characterized by fewer exits
at the beginning of the stock rebuilding process. Figure 2(a) illustrates this fact and
shows that with effort controls there are not exits. However, Figure 2(b) shows for the
same period that without effort controls some firms exit in the first few months and
firms enter at the end of the period considered.
The economic reason for this different entry/exit behavior is that even though the
percentage of reduction in output is the same in both economies, in the economy with
input controls it represents a smaller fraction of the fixed costs of each vessel (as output
per vessel is smaller in this economy). This generates fewer exits.
2. With input controls vessels enter earlier and in greater numbers than when non-
distortionary policies are used. Figure 3 shows that excess capacity, measured as the
difference between measures g(z, t) associated with the different policies for each z and
t, is positive for each z and t. This difference is larger for low productivity levels (i.e.
14Therefore profits are equal to pi(z, t) = (1− τ(t))y(z, t)− w(t)l(z, t)− cf .
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Figure 2: Entry- exit behaviour on the stock rehabilitation path,
for z closer to zero). This means that excess capacity is relatively more concentrated
in vessels with low productivity.
Therefore, with input controls the fleet is replenished λg(z, t) with less efficient vessels.
This means that entry increases capacity more slowly than when non-distortionary
policies are used. This is the economic rationale for the different entry patterns in the
two economies.
These findings can be summarized by computing the excess capacity associated with the
use of input controls. We compute the excess of capacity associated with the distortionary
policy as the difference in each period between capital in the fishery regulated with input
controls and capital in the fishery regulated with a non-distortionary instrument, as shown
in Figures 4(a) and 4(b).
Figure 4(a) represents the number of vessels (in percentage terms) associated with a reg-
ulatory policy based on input controls and the number of vessels associated with a policy
based on non-distortionary instruments for each moment in time. Figure 4(b) represents the
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Figure 3: Excess of capacity, measured as the difference between measures g(z, t) associated
with the different policies for each z and t,
difference between the number of vessels (in percentage terms) associated with a regulatory
policy based on input controls and the number of vessels associated with a policy based on
non-distortionary instruments for each moment in time. We refer to this number as ”the
excess of the fleet”. The figure shows that the excess of the fleet is always positive. It is
increasing in the early periods and is close to 16% in some periods. Later, it remains positive
and stabilizes at around 14%.
5 Discussion and conclusions
In a given already overcapitalized fishery a policy of input controls makes the problem even
worse as the excess of capital is always positive with respect to that which results from
other less distortionary policies. Empirical evidence provided by the Spanish fleet seems to
support our findings. The management system in the Mediterranean is mainly based on
effort restrictions (limitations on average days at sea and other measures of time per vessel),
so our results mean that we should expect more excess capacity in fleets operating in the
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Figure 4: Fleet size dynamics
Mediterranean than in fleets operating in the Atlantic. Figure 5 shows the status of the
Spanish fleets. The long-term economic profitability of vessels as measured by Return on
Fixed Tangible Assets (ROFTA, calculated as Net profit/Capital Value) is plotted on the y-
axis and the Sustainable Harvest Indicator (SHI) on the x-axis. SHI measures the degree to
which a fleet segment depends on overexploited stocks at levels above MSY for its revenues.
SHI values greater than 1.2 indicate that fleets are operating under biological imbalance.
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Source: MAAMMA (2014).
Figure 5 shows that Mediterranean fleets do indeed operate under lower ROFTA and greater
biological imbalance than Atlantic fleets. This suggests a higher excess capacity in the
Mediterranean fleets than in the Atlantic ones. This is consistent with the conclusion drawn
from the results. In the modeling framework presented, in the steady state equilibrium
a policy of limiting fishing days leads to smaller vessels with lower yields, lower individual
profits, and lower wages. The lower wages allow less productive vessels (that would otherwise
exit) to stay in the fishery, reducing the average productivity of the fleet. The result of input
controls is that more vessels are required to achieve the same biological targets, which means
an overcapitalized fleet.
We also characterized the transition dynamics caused by stock rehabilitation policies leading
the fishery from a given status quo to a stationary situation where all stocks are at their
maximum sustainable yield fishing mortality levels. We show that on the stock rehabilitation
path, capital depends on the use (or not) of input controls. We conclude that without input
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controls firms exit on the transition path and the stock of capital in the fishery is reduced.
However, when input controls are used no firms exit on the transition path and the capital
is not reduced. Under rational expectations, less productive vessels stay in the fishery and
pay the idling cost to wait for better times. In addition, we show that the excess of capacity
associated with input controls also produces lower average levels of productivity as it is
relatively more concentrated in vessels with low productivity. Furthermore, the excess of the
fleet associated with this type of policy is always positive.
From the policy perspective we relax the assumption that fishing firms’ form expectations of
the productivity of current capital based only on the current level of the biomass in deciding
the level of capital investment or disinvestment. In this case rational expectations discount
future fishing possibilities so the decision to enter or exit is based on the future evolution
of the fishery. This is an extremely relevant modeling characteristic when stock rebuilding
policies are assessed, given that firms’ behavior can be influenced by the “bright” future
coming from the policy. Furthermore, this characteristic is not constrained to the fishery
policy itself, but must be considered when dealing with natural regimen shifts that can be
caused by, for example, climate change.
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A Appendix
A.1 Steady State
Given an output restriction, Q(t), and an input control τl, an equilibrium is a measure of firms
g(z, t), wages w(t), value functions of incumbents v(z, t), individual decision rules l(z, t), y(z, t),
and a threshold z(t), such that:
i) (Firm optimization) Given prices w(t), the exit rule, Iexit(z, t) and v(z, t) solve the incumbent
problem, equation (1), and l(z, t), y(z, t), are optimal policy functions.
ii) (Firm measure) g(z, t) satisfies the Kolmogorov-Fokker-Planck equation (2).
ii) (Market clearing-feasibility) Given individual decision rules and the firm measure function,
w(t) and z(t), solve equations (3-4).
The steady state economy can be represented by the following system of equations
min
Iexit(z)
{
ρv(z)− pi(z) + cf − µz∂zv(z)− σ
2
z
2
∂zzv(z), v(z)− S
}
,
−∂z[µzg(z)] + σ
2
z
2
∂zzg(z)− (Iexit(z) + λ)g(z, t) + ge(z, t) = 0,∫ ∞
z
g(z)dz = N,∫ zc
z
y∗g(z)dz +
∫ ∞
zc
y(z)cg(z)dz = Q,
e [Q− cfN ] = w.
Finally, note that in a stationary equilibrium ge(z) = g(z) and I = 0.
Following Achdou et al. (2014) Achdou et al. (2015) we use a finite difference method and ap-
proximate the fuctions v(z, t) and g(z, t) (equations 1 and 2). We use the shorthand notation
vni = v(zi, tn) and g
n
i = g(zi, tn).
Linear Complementarity Problems (LCP). We approximate (1)
ρvni = pi
n
i + [µi]
+
(
vni+1−vni
∆z
)
+ [µi]
−
(
vni −vni−1
∆z
)
+ σ
2
z
2
(
vni+1−2vni +vni−1
∆z2
)
+
(
vn+1i −vni
∆t
)
,
where [µi]
+ = max{µi, 0} and [µi]− = min{µi, 0}. Therefore, collecting terms, we have
ρvni = pi
n
i + aiv
n
i−1 + biv
n
i + civ
n
i+1 +
(
vn+1i − vni
∆t
)
, where
ai = −min{µi, 0}
∆z
+
σ2z
2∆z2
,
bi = −max{µi, 0}
∆z
+
min{µi, 0}
∆z
− σ
2
z
∆z2
,
ci =
max{µi, 0}
∆z
+
σ2z
2∆z2
.
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Note that ai + bi + ci = 0. Thus, equation (5) in matrix form is
ρvn = pin +Avn +
1
∆t
(
vn+1 − vn) ,
where (for i=1,2,3,4)
A =

b1 c1 0 0
a2 b2 c2 0
0 a3 b3 c3
0 0 a4 bˆ4
 .
Boundary conditions: from ∂zv(∞, t) = 0 we have, vnI = vnI+1, then bˆI = bI + σ
2
z
2∆z2
such that
aI + bI = 0.
To solve equation (1) we follow Huang and Pang (1988). They show that the variational inequality
problem (the discretized version of equation (1) )
min
Iexit(z,t)
{
ρvn − pin −Avn − 1
∆t
(
vn+1 − vn) , vn − Sn} ,
can be formulated as Linear Complementarity Problems (LCP), i.e.
(vn − Sn) ⊥ (B(vn − Sn) + qm+1) = 0,
(vn − Sn) ≥ 0,
B(vn − Sn) + qm+1 ≥ 0,
where B =
(
ρ+ 1∆t
)
I−A and qm+1 = BSn − pin − 1∆tvn+1.15
Kolmogorov Forward equation. We approximate the KFP equation (2) using the following
approximation for ∂z[µzv(z, t)]
∂z[µzv(z, t)] '
[(
[µi]
+gni − [µi−1]+gni−1
∆z
)
+ [
(
[µi+1]
−gni+1 − [µi−]−gni
∆z
)]
.
Therefore, we have(
gn+1i − gni
∆t
)
= ci−1gni−1 + big
n
i + ai+1g
n
i+1 − Ini gni + δn, where
ai+1 = −min{µi+1, 0}
∆z
+
σ2z
2∆z2
,
bi = −max{µi, 0}
∆z
+
min{µi, 0}
∆z
− σ
2
z
∆z2
,
ci−1 =
max{µi−1, 0}
∆z
+
σ2z
2∆z2
.
Note that (5) in matrix form
1
∆t
(
gn+1 − gn) = AT gn
15 Matlab provides Yuval Tassa’s Newton-based LCP solver, downloadable from http://www.mathworks.
com/matlabcentral/fileexchange/20952.
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where (for i=1,2,3,4)
AT =

b1 a2 0 0
c1 b2 a3 0
0 c2 b3 a4
0 0 c3 b4
 .
and gn = Inexitg
n. Finally density is computed as fi =
gi∑I
i=1 gi∆z
, where
∑I
i=1 gi∆z is the mass of
firms.
A.2 Age-structured Stock dynamics
For each species we use an age-structured model (see Figure 6) to assess the impact of each fishing
mortality, F (t), trajectory to Fmsy (see Figure 7) on landings generated by the transitional dynam-
ics of the stocks, n(a, t) (see Figure 8). Let n(a, t) be the number of fish of age a at time t. As in
Botsford and Wainwright (1985), the conservation law is described by the following McKendrick-von
Foerster partial differential equation:16
∂n(a, t)
∂t
= −∂n(a, t)
∂a
− [m(a) + p(a)F (t)]n(a, t). (5)
Equation (5) states that the rate of change in the number of fish in a given age interval,
∂n(a, t)
∂t
,
is equal to the net rate of departure less the rate of deaths. Given all fish ages, the net rate of
departure is equal to
∂n(a, t)
∂a
. The rate of deaths at age a is proportional to the number of fish of
age a, i.e. [m(a) + p(a)F (t)]n(a, t).
Moreover, in order to pose the model properly, Equation (5) need to be completed with an initial
condition at t = 0 and a boundary condition at a = 0, thus providing the initial number of fishes
at each age and the recruitment at each time 17 . Thus we consider:
n(a, 0) = n0(a), n(0, t) = 1 (6)
Note that when solving Equation (5) in the interval [0, A] for the ages, we can identify a large
enough value of A so that all fishes die (just recovering n(A, t) = 0, which cannot be imposed in
the model).
For a given F (t) trajectory, catches at age a are equal to p(a)F (t)n(a, t), therefore Q(t), is equal
to
Q(t) =
(∫ A
0
ω(a)p(a)n(a, t)da
)
F (t).
16See Von-Foerster (1959) and McKendrick (1926).
17A Stock Recruitment relationship can be assumed. In that case, each period, the number of fish at age
zero is given by n(0, t) = Ψ(
∫ A
0
ω(a)µ(a)n(a, t)da), where,
∫ A
0
ω(a)µ(a)n(a, t)da is the SSB. See Da-Rocha
et al. (2012).
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Figure 6: Age Structured Models
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Figure 7: Targets
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Figure 8: Equilibrium Distributions by age
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A.3 Transitions
This appendix focuses on characterizing the transition dynamics caused by stock rehabilitation
policies leading the fishery from a given status quo to a stationary situation where all stocks are
at their maximum sustainable yield fishing mortality levels (Fmsy). Our characterization strategy
follows two steps. First, we set a drastic reduction of Fmsy for all species in the fishery and
compute the value of landings (VA) using the age structured mode (see Appendix A.2). Second,
given the VA for the Spanish fleet associated with a reduction to Fmsy for all species, we compute
the transition dynamics associated with the non-distortionary instrument τ(t)18 that drive the
fishery from the status quo (the VA associated with fishing mortality in the status quo) to the
stationary solution where fishing mortality is Fmsy for all species. We assume that tax revenue
is returned to households in the form of a non-distortionary lump sum transfer. Tax revenue is
T (t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
τ(t)y(t)g(z, t)dz. The transitional dynamics are described by the following system of
equations
min
Iexit(z,t)
{
ρv(z, t)− pi(t)z + cf − µz∂zv(z, t)− σ
2
z
2
∂zzv(z, t)− ∂tv(z, t), v(z, t)− S(t)
}
,
−∂z[µzg(z, t)] + σ
2
z
2
∂zzg(z, t)− (Iexit(z, t) + λ)g(z, t) + ge(z, t) = ∂tg(z, t),∫ ∞
z(t)
g(z, t)dz = N(t)∫ zc(t)
z(t)
y∗(t)g(z, t)dz +
∫ ∞
zc(t)
y(t, z)cg(z, t)dz = Q(t),
e [Q(t)− cfN(t)] = w(t)
Exit(t) =
∫ ∞
z(t)
Iexit(z, t)g(z, t)dz
We solve this system using the following algorithm.
1. First, we compute the stationary value functions, v(z|Q) ,and fleet distributions, g(z|Q),
associated with the status quo, Q0 = 1, and the stock rehabilitation, QT = 2.407.
2. Second, we guess a function τ(t) ∀t = 1, .., T , then we follow this iterative procedure:
(a) Given w(t), compute v(z, t) by solving the HJB equation (7) with terminal condition
v(z|QT ) and also compute Iexit(z, t);
(b) Given Iexit(z, t), compute g(z, t) by solving the KFP equation (7) using g(z|Q0) as the
initial conditions;
(c) Given g(z, t), calculate w1(t) using equation ( 7) and update w(t). Stop when w1(t) is
sufficiently close to w(t).
(d) Given w(t), compute Q(t). Allow entry if Q(t) is lower than the VA path associated
with the stock rehabilitation policy.
3. Stop when Q(t) is sufficiently close to the VA path. Otherwise update τ(t)
18τ(t) can be interpreted as a tax rate or as the price of an ITQ in a system of fully tradable individual
quotas.
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